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Abstract The majority of recent cyber incidents have been caused by malware.
According to a report by Symantec, an average of onemillionmalicious codes is found
daily. Automated static and dynamic analysis technologies are generally applied to
cope with this, but most of the new malicious codes are the mutants of existing mal-
ware. In this paper, we present technology that automatically detects the n-gram and
clustering coefficient-based malware mutants and that automatically groups the differ-
ent types of malware. We verified our system by applying more than 2600 malicious
codes. Our proposed technology does more than just respond to malware as it can also
provide the ground for the effective analysis of new malware, the trend analysis of a
malware group, the automatic identification of specific malware, and the analysis of
the estimated trend of an attacker.
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1 Introduction
The majority of recent cyber incidents have been caused by malware. The major
cyber incidents in Korea such as 7.7 DDoS in 2009, 3.4 DDoS in 2011, and the 6.25
cyber-attack in 2013 were all caused by malware. Such malicious codes are increasing
drastically every year. According to the 2014 Symantec Security Intelligence Report,
the number ofmalicious codes in 2014 increased by 26% from2013 to onemillion new
malicious codes on a daily average and 317million for the year [1]. The companies that
analyze malware have been distributing technologies to quickly collect and respond
to the numerous new malicious codes that appear every day. However, most of the
one million new malicious codes on the average daily basis are not new types of
malware, but are mutants of malicious codes already collected and managed. Aside
from analyzing each malicious code and responding to it, analyzing the malware-
mutant relationship will make it possible to intelligently analyze the significance,
which was not possible in the past [2].
The benefits of intelligent analysis can be summarized as follows: first, static analy-
sis and dynamic analysis are used to determine the maliciousness of malware, but
there is the limitation of being able to accurately detect it. If an analyzed code is
found to be similar to tens of known malicious codes, it will help lower the rate of
incorrect/missed detection of malicious malware. Second, since a malware mutant
is produced by reusing and varying the existing code, the analysis result of mal-
ware mutants provides the grounds to estimate if an intrusion attack is the action of
the same attacker. Third, it can provide the priority to analyze and respond to the
one million malicious codes that appear each day. When a malware with significant
destructive force is registered in advance, an alarm can be automatically activated to
enable a priority response when its mutant is identified among so many malicious
codes. In the same way, a low priority can be assigned to malware, such as down-
loader and dropper, that is not as destructive. Fourth, observing the change of all the
analyzed malware groups over time can lead to the analysis of the nature of recent
malwares and the trend in changes regarding production techniques. Such malware
mutant analysis technology makes it possible to not only respond to each malware but
also to understand the overall meaning of analyzed malwares and to respond to them
intelligently.
This paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 introduces previous studies on the
analysis of malware similarity, and Sect. 3 proposes the malware similarity and
grouping technology developed in this study. Section 4 presents the test results
of the developed system and typical malwares, while Sect. 5 summarizes the sig-
nificance of the test results and describes the future work that we will carry
out.
2 Related work
There are many ongoing studies on the analysis of malware similarity being carried
out, and they can be mainly divided into the categories of static analysis and dynamic
analysis. Xin Hu reported on the static analysis of the similarity of a call flow graph
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Table 1 Comparison of related works and proposed model
Author Approach Proposed Model
Xin Hu Call flow graph-based analysis Behavior-based analysis
M. Alazab Malicious API list extraction-based
malware mutant analysis
Can detect malware mutant
regardless of new malicious APIs
L. Wu Regular expression-based analysis The sequence of all and the subset
are considered, as well as the
frequency of APIs
Inoue Element behavior-based analysis Do not need to recognize the basic
element of malicious behavior
Natani Representative API and
frequency-based analysis
API sequence and cosine
similarity-based approach
with the original malware [3–5]. M. Alazab statically analyzed the malicious codes
to extract a list of APIs that can call and measure the similarity based on it [6–
8]. Although these studies apply some detection performance, their effectiveness is
limited as the majority of malwares are packed (Table1). Even if the known packer
is unpacked in advance, it is still difficult to respond to a custom packing set by the
attacker [9].
In the dynamic analysis of malware, there have been various studies based on the
called API sequence [10]. U. Bayer cataloged the malicious behaviors of more than
90,000malwares to provide the foundation to analyze the behaviors generated bymany
malwares [11], while L. Wu transformed the API sequence into a regular expression
and detected themalicious code when a similar pattern of regular expressions occurred
[12]. Inoue and Daisuke analyzed the unit function and malicious behavior of called
API sequences in advance and determined the maliciousness based on the generation
of the same pattern [13–16]. Although such studies enable the analysis based on the
elemental malicious behavior identification data of malwares, there is the significant
possibility of the incorrect identification of elemental malicious behaviors, and there
is the limitation of not being able to detect new malware that is different from the
known pattern. Natani and Pratiksha identified APIs that are frequently called by
malicious codes and their frequencies in advance and analyzed malwares based on
them [17,18]. There has also been a study that compared the calling sequence in
the edit-distance method. The method of using leading APIs and their frequencies is
limited in that API selection is not easy as normal files also use the APIs used by
malicious codes and that the simple frequency can often result in incorrect detection.
In addition, although the edit-distance-based similarity comparison can be effective
for identifying the similarity of an entire API sequence of malicious code. However,
the malware mutants not only reuse the known codes, but also include the additional
malicious functions. Thus, comparing the whole sequence can be limited in measuring
the accurate result. Furthermore, these studies only address the comparison of the
similarity between two malwares but do not include the automatic identification of
malware groups. In this paper, Sect. 3 presents the technology to group the malware
similarities.
123
T. Lee et al.
Fig. 1 System overview
Fig. 2 API extraction and code generation
3 Proposed scheme
3.1 System overview
This section describes the overall structure of the proposed technology. When a mal-
ware attacks, the system uses the Cuckoo Sandbox method to collect the API behavior
data that are present when the malware is executed [19–21]. As the APIs are typically
called in 2000–20,000 sequences, they are transformed into the formatted codes and
the sequences of the transformed API data are grouped using an n-gram. The sim-
ilarities between malicious codes are then calculated according to the frequency of
the API sequence and the malware mutant groups are created based on them. Figure1
shows the structure of the system.
3.2 Malware mutant detection
The malware similarity analysis is based on the API calls generated when the malware
is executed. The API calls are collected using Cuckoo Sandbox. For effective calcula-
tion, the call data are separately stored and managed according to the API codes and
parameters. Figure2 shows an example of API call data and its codification.
Since the performance of a similarity comparison algorithm depends on how much
it reflects the characteristics of the malware mutant, the following facts must be con-
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Fig. 3 n-gram-based comparison set extraction
sidered: first, since a malware mutant is produced reusing the same code, the same
API call sequences appear in the reused model. However, additional codes, such as the
additional functions, are added to the common part. Thus, the sequence similarity of
the subset and not the entire API sequence is important. Second, there is a limitation
when using pattern-based detection since each malicious code uses different common
API sequences. Therefore, the common subset must be automatically identified in all
API sequences. Moreover, the system should also consider the fact that there can be
multiple such subsets in different locations. Third, if the commonAPI sequence occurs
frequently, the weight factor in exponential form should be reflected in consideration
of the statistical value of the frequency. In this paper, we reflect these characteristics
and analyze the similarity among malicious codes in an n-gram-based comparison
of the cosine similarities between API sequence subsets. The n-gram extracts the
comparison sets as shown below (Fig. 3).
The cosine similarity method, which is used for comparing the similarity of two
vectors, is used to compare the API sequences extracted in the n-gram method. The
cosine similarity reflects the characteristics of the malware mutant described above.
The calculated similarity has the value between 0 and 1, and the similarity mutant is
determined based on the threshold value. As I described, malware mutant is generated
with the same codes belong to the original malware. There is no clear definition but
it is tightly related to the code reuse. Therefore, similarity threshold may be changed
according the purposes. In the realworld, ifwewant tofind the same attacker’smalware
mutant for the particular malware, it needs the tight threshold. If we want to analyze
the entire malware group trends, the lower threshold is appropriate. The equation for
calculating the similarity between two malicious codes is shown as:
Similarity = cos (θ) = A · B||A| |B|| =
∑n





3.3 Malware group classification
The method of measuring the similarities among the malicious codes is described
above. The method enables a total comparison of a large volume of malicious codes.
Although the result of the total comparison of each malicious code is useful for listing
123
T. Lee et al.
Fig. 4 Group generation step
Table 2 Group generation algorithm
the codes in a manner similar to a malicious code, it does not provide much more
significance than that. This paper presents a technique of grouping the malicious code
groups based on the malware mutants. Figure4 shows how the malware mutants are
grouped.
First, all “n”malicious codes that are similar to a malicious code are grouped. Then,
if a malicious code is similar to any of the malicious codes in the group, the similar
malicious code is added to the group. If a malicious code is not similar to any other
malicious codes, it is then categorized into a new group. Table2 provides a summary
of the malicious code grouping algorithm.
A malware mutant group means that all malicious codes in the group are in mutant
relations and that the group has common characteristics. This algorithm analyzes how
closely each group member is related to the group and filters out the insignificant
malicious cods. It uses the local clustering coefficient to analyze the closeness of a
malicious code to the group. The local clustering coefficient indicates how close a
member of a group is to all other nodes in the same group.
The graph G = (V, E) formally consists of a set of vertices, V , and a set of edges,
E , between them. Here, a vertex means each malicious code, while Si, j means the
similarity value obtained by the cosine similarity calculation of the malicious codes
vi and v j . The symbol, t, means the threshold of the similarity value to determine the
malware mutant. For example, if Si, j is larger than t , the malicious codes vi and v j are
considered to be the malware mutants. When two malicious codes are determined to
be the malware mutants, the vertices are connected by an edge. This can be expressed
as follows:
ei, j = {ei, j : Si, j ≥ t} for every i, j
123
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Now, the equation for the local clustering coefficient is used to calculate the closeness
of a malicious code to the group. Assuming that the vertex determined to be the mutant
is Ni and that the number of all vertices to be connected to vi is ki , Ni can be expressed
as follows:
Ni = {v j : ei, j ∈ E and e j,i ∈ E} for every j
ki means the number of edges that can be connected with vi and the number of all the






2|{e jk : v j , vk ∈ Ni , e jk ∈ E}|






Ci is a value between 0 and 1, which indicates how close vi is to the group. If Ci of
a malicious code is 0.9, the malicious code is clearly qualified to be a member of the
group, while Ci of 0.4 means that the malicious code should be excluded from the
group. If the average C¯ of all the vertices of a group is 0.9, it indicates that the group is
properly formed of the members of a group. If C¯ is 0.5, it indicates that the malicious
codes are incorrectly grouped. So far, we have described the grouping of malwares and
indexes indicating the suitability of eachmember of the group. Grouping is determined
by t, which is the threshold that confirms the similarity between malicious codes. In
other words, there are groups that are formed by the value of t and the vertices existing
in each group. Assuming that G1,G2. . .Gn are the top n members of a malware group
and that CG,ı is the average local cluster coefficient of Gi , the suitability of grouping
can be determined by CG . Moreover, assuming that the number of malicious codes in




i=1 CG,ı Gratio =
the number of malwares belonged to any group
the number of all themalwares
Here, CG increases, while Gratio decreases as t increases. Therefore, the optimum
value of threshold t needs to be set.
The next section describes the system development and the verification results from
dealing with malicious codes.
4 Experimental results
4.1 Malware similarity analysis
We tested the system to check if it can automatically detect financial extortion mali-
cious codes, which are known to be the malware mutants. The detection result is
represented by a total comparison of 39 malicious codes. Table3 shows examples of
the similarity results amongst 39 malicious codes. It indicates that most of them have
similarities.
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Fig. 5 Malware mutant relations
Figure5 depicts themutant relations of all compared samples. Each node represents
a malicious code, and the nodes are connected with a line if they were found to be
mutants of each other.
The detected result indicates that most of the 39 malicious codes were more than
just similar and, thus, this result confirms that the financial extortion malwares can be
further categorized into subgroups. We collected 2639 malwares randomly in addition
to the tested 39malware test samples and compared them to check if there aremalicious
codes that are similar to the test samples. The comparison detected many malwares
that are in mutant relations with the 39 test samples. Table4 shows the malwares that
were identified to be in mutant relations with smss.exe and msn.exe.
4.2 Malware group classification analysis
The results of the similarity analysis of malicious codes have been described above.
Multiple malwares were totally compared to manually group the malwares. If there
are hundreds of thousands of malwares to be analyzed, the automatic malware group-
ing system is needed. This study analyzed 2639 malwares for grouping. The analysis
showed 210 groups, and the top 10 groups contained 1121 malwares, which constitute
around 42.8% of the total malwares. That means that around 40% of all malwares
can be automatically categorized into 10 leading groups, and the characteristics of
these groups can be analyzed in advance. This will be very useful in deducing the
behavior and significance of malwares. CG , which represents the suitability of group-
ing, is affected by t. Figure6 shows the grouping of 2639 malwares according to the
threshold t.
As the threshold t increases, the number of members in each group decreases, but
the accuracy of the members of the malware group increases. By the same token,
as the threshold decreases, the number of members in each group increases, but the
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t = 91% t = 95% t = 99%
Fig. 6 Malware group visualization. t = 91%, t = 95%, t = 99%
Table 5 Gratio,CG relation according to the threshold t
Threshold t (%) No. of group members No. of groups Gratio (%) CG
99 1827 246 69.231 0.9963
98 1932 243 73.210 0.9585
97 2005 232 75.976 0.9341
96 2065 213 78.249 0.9065
95 2065 213 78.249 0.9065
94 2100 195 79.576 0.8979
93 2203 172 83.479 0.8615
92 2240 156 84.881 0.8695
91 2265 152 85.828 0.8712
90 2285 138 86.586 0.8804
accuracy of the members of the malware group decreases. Table5 shows the changes
of the Gratio and CG according to the threshold t through the test.
For example, if 90% of the CG is needed, the threshold t can be set to 95%, and
this means that 78% of malicious codes can be grouped. With a 2.5GHz CPU server,
it took an average of 0.0097 seconds to compare the similarities of malicious codes,
which means that approximately nine million malicious codes can be analyzed daily.
5 Conclusions
Malware is the key cause of cyber intrusion incidents. Since malware is continu-
ously enhanced and concealed, its countermeasures are also being constantly studied.
The malware similarity analysis and automatic grouping technology play the very
important role of making the countermeasures more effective. They can automatically
identify the key malwares from amongst a huge volume of malicious codes, a million
of which are collected each day, and can automatically filter out the less destructive
malicious codes, such as the downloader and dropper, and the malware mutants are
useful in studying the trends and patterns of the same attackers. Although malware
analysis companies manage them in their own ways, the development of a general
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purpose technology is still far-off. This paper has confirmed the usefulness of the pro-
posed technology through verification, but the development of technology for selective
comparison instead of total comparison is needed to analyze new malicious codes, so
that it can be utilized in the general environment. We are considering the following
approaches. We will select the representative malwares of each group and it is updated
periodically according to the each malware’s local clustering coefficient. If the new
malware arrives, it is compared the representative malwares of the each group and it
is compared entirely within only one group. This paper also analyzed the accuracy of
grouping using CG according to the threshold t. However, further studies are required
since it does not represent the individual accuracy of each group member [22,23].
We intend to continue operating the developed system in general environments and to
improve the system.
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